The ability to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for any intelligent system. Many proposals have been offered in the past to deal with this problem. In this paper, we offer a new approach to belief change associated with performing actions that addresses some of the shortcomings of these approaches. In particular, our approach is based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus extended to deal with belief. Moreover, our account handles nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken belief, and handles belief revision and belief update together with iterated belief change.
Introduction
An agent acting in its environment must be capable of reasoning about the state of its environment and keeping track of any changes to the environment due to the performing of actions. Various theories have been developed to give an account of how this can be achieved. Foremost among these are theories of belief change and theories for reasoning about action. While originating from different initial motivations, the two are united in their aim to have agents maintain a model of the environment that matches the actual environment as closely as possible given the available information. An important consideration is the ability to deal with more than one change; known as the problem of iterated belief change.
In this paper, we consider a new approach for modeling iterated belief change using the language of the situation calculus [15] . While our approach is limited in its applicability, we feel that it is conceptually very simple and offers a number of useful features not found in other approaches:
It is completely integrated with a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus [18] and its extension to handle knowledge expansion [19] . Specifically, how beliefs change in our account is simply a special case of how other fluents change as the result of actions, and thus among other things, we inherit a solution to the frame problem.
Like Scherl and Levesque [19] , our theory accommodates both belief update and belief expansion. The former concerns beliefs that change as the result of the realization that the world has changed; the latter concerns beliefs that change as the result of new information acquired.
Unlike Scherl and Levesque, however, our theory is not limited to belief expansion; rather it deals with the more general case of belief revision. It will be possible in our model for an agent to believe some formula ¡ , acquire information that causes it to change its mind and believe
¢ ¡
(without believing the world has changed), and later go back to believing ¡ again. In Scherl and Levesque and in other approaches based on this work such as [12, 13] , new information that contradicts previous beliefs cannot be consistently accommodated.
Because belief change in our model is always the result of action, our account naturally supports iterated belief change. This is simply the result of a sequence of actions. Moreover, each individual action can potentially cause both an update (by changing the world) and a revision (by providing sensing information) in a seamless way.
Like Scherl and Levesque and unlike many previous approaches to belief change, e.g., [9, 11] , our approach supports belief introspection: an agent will know what it believes and does not believe. Furthermore, it has information about the past, and so will also know what it used to believe and not believe. Finally, an agent will be able to predict what it will believe after it acquires information through sensing.
Unlike Scherl and Levesque, our agents will be able to introspectively tell the difference between an update and a revision as it moves from believing ¡ to believing ¢ ¡
. In the former case, the agent will believe that it believed ¡ in the past, and that it was correct to do so; in the latter case, it will believe that it believed ¡ in the past but that it was mistaken.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we briefly review the situation calculus including the Scherl and Levesque [19] model of belief expansion, and we review the most popular accounts of belief revision, belief update and iterated belief change; in Section 3, we motivate and define a new belief operator as a modification to the one used by Scherl and Levesque; in Section 4, we prove some properties of this operator, justifying the points made above; in Section 5, we show the operator in action on a simple example, and how an agent can change its mind repeatedly; in Section 6, we consider the importance of our work and compare it to some of the existing approaches to belief change; in the final section, we draw some conclusions and discuss future work.
Background
The basis of our framework for belief change is an action theory [18] based on the situation calculus [15] , and extended to include a belief operator [19] . In this section, we begin with a brief overview of the situation calculus and follow it with a short review of belief change.
Situation Calculus
The situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for representing dynamically changing domains. A situation represents a snapshot of the domain. There is a set of initial situations corresponding to the ways the agent 1 believes the domain might be initially. The actual initial state of the domain is represented by the distinguished initial situation constant, 1 The situation calculus can accommodate multiple agents, but for the purposes of this paper we assume that there is a single agent, and all actions are performed by that agent. . The effects of actions on fluents are defined using successor state axioms [18] , which provide a succinct representation for both effect axioms and frame axioms [15] . For example, assume that there are only two rooms,
'
and 0 3 2
, and that the action LEAVE takes the agent from the current room to the other room. Then, the successor state axiom for INR' is:
This axiom asserts that the agent will be in
after doing some action iff either the agent is in 0 C 2
) and leaves it or the agent is currently in
and the action is anything other than leaving it.
Moore [16] defined a possible-worlds semantics for a modal logic of knowledge in the situation calculus by treating situations as possible worlds. Scherl and Levesque [19] adapted the semantics to the action theories of Reiter [18] . The idea is to have an accessibility relation on situations,
There are various ways of axiomatizing dynamic applications in the situation calculus. Here we adopt a simple form of the guarded action theories described by De Giacomo and Levesque [10] consisting of: (1) successor state axioms 3 for each fluent (including D and pl introduced below), and guarded sensed fluent axioms for each action, as discussed above; (2) unique names axioms for the actions, and domain-independent foundational axioms (similar to the ones given by Lakemeyer and Levesque [12] ), which we do not describe further here; and (3) initial state axioms, which describe the initial state of the domain and the initial beliefs of the agent. 4 For simplicity, we assume here that all actions are always executable and omit the action precondition axioms and references to a Poss predicate that are normally included in situation calculus action theories.
In what follows, we will use V to refer to a guarded action theory of this form. By a domain-dependent fluent, we mean a fluent other than D or pl, and a domain-dependent formula is one that only mentions domain-dependent fluents. Finally, we say that a domain-dependent formula is uniform in iff is the only situation term in that formula.
Belief Change
Before formally defining a belief operator in this language, we briefly review the notion of belief change as it exists in the literature. Belief change, simply put, aims to study the manner in which an agent's epistemic (belief) state should change when the agent is confronted by new information. In the literature, 5 there is often a clear distinction between two forms of belief change: revision and update. Both forms can be characterized by an axiomatic approach (in terms of rationality postulates) or through various constructions (e.g., epistemic entrenchment, possible worlds, etc.). The AGM theory [9] is the prototypical example of belief revision while the KM framework [11] is often identified with belief update.
Intuitively speaking, belief revision is appropriate for modeling static environments about which the agent has only partial and possibly incorrect information. New information is used to fill in gaps and correct errors, but the environment itself does not undergo change. Belief update, on the other hand, is intended for situations in which the environment itself is changing due to the performing of actions.
For completeness and later comparison, we list here the 3 We could use the more general guarded successor state axioms of De Giacomo and Levesque [10] , but regular successor state axioms suffice for the simple domain we consider here. 4 These are axioms that only describe initial situations. Reiter [18] has W Y X as the only initial situation, but to formalize belief, we need additional ones. 5 We shall restrict our attention to approaches in the AGM vein [1, 9, 11] although there are many others.
AGM postulates [1, 9] 
If`is complete and 
In Section 6.2, we return to consider the extent to which our framework satisfies these postulates. 6 In the AGM theory, 
denotes the set of all consistent complete theories of h containing f . 7 To facilitate comparison with the AGM postulates, we have reformulated the original postulates of Katsuno and Mendelzon into an equivalent set using AGM-style terminology [17] . For renderings of these postulates and the AGM postulates above in the KM-style, refer to Katsuno & Mendelzon [11] . 
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denotes the formula that results from substituting for now in ¡ . To make the formulae easier to read, we will often suppress the situation argument of fluents in the scope of a belief operator, e.g., Bel¦ INR'
© )
. Scherl and Levesque [19] , define a modal operator for belief in terms of the accessibility relation on situations,
. For Scherl and Levesque, the believed formulae are the ones true in all accessible situations: 
in the figure) is not 
. The result is that the agent believes the light is on in
. This is an example of belief expansion because the belief that the light is on was simply added to the belief state of the agent.
Our definition of Bel is similar to the one in Scherl and Levesque, but we are going to generalize their account in order to be able to talk about how plausible the agent considers a situation to be. Plausibility is assigned to situations using a function pl¦ ) , whose range is the natural numbers, where lower values indicate higher plausibility. The pl function only has to be specified over initial situations, using an initial state axiom. The plausibility of successor situations is left unchanged using the following successor state axiom:
Unlike Scherl and Levesque, we will say that the agent believes a proposition
Here is our definition of the belief operator:
is believed at precisely when it holds at all the most plausible situations B-related to . Note that the actual numbers assigned to the situations are not relevant. All that is important is the ordering of the situations by plausibility. We could have used any total pre-order on situations for this purpose, but using on natural numbers simplifies the presentation of our framework.
We now return to the initial situations in Figure 1 , and add a plausibility structure to the belief state of the agent by supposing that
£ '
is more plausible than £ 2
(indicated by the circle surrounding
). For example, suppose that pl¦£
. Now, the beliefs of the agent are determined only by £ '
. Therefore, the agent now has a belief about the light in
'
in £ , namely that the light is off. After leaving 0 C 2 and entering
, the agent continues to believe that the light is off. After doing SENSELIGHT ,
is the most plausible accessible situation, which means that it determines the beliefs of the agent. Since the light is on in
, the agent believes it is on in £ ! $ !
. Since the agent goes from believing the light is off to believing it is on, this is a case of belief revision.
Both accounts of belief handle belief introspection of current and past beliefs. In order to obtain positive and negative introspection of beliefs, we require D to be initially transitive and euclidean. For notational simplicity, we combine the two constraints into a single constraint, which says that any situation that is D -related to an initial situation is D -related to the same situations as . We assert this constraint as an initial state axiom:
As in Scherl and Levesque, the successor state axiom for D ensures that this constraint is preserved over all situations:
In order to clarify how this constraint ensures that introspection is handled properly, we will show that in the example illustrated in Figure 1 , the agent positively introspects its past beliefs. First, we need some notation that allows us to talk about the past. We use Previously¦ ¡ © )
to denote that ¡ held in the situation immediately before :
Definition 4
Previously
We want to show that Bel¦ Previously
holds, i.e., in
, the agent believes that in the previous situation it believed that the light in , we only require 9 Recall that we omit the situation argument of fluents in the scope of a Bel operator whenever possible.
holds. Since this is true, we see that Bel¦ Previously
is also true.
The specification of pl and D over the initial situations is the responsibility of the axiomatizer of the domain in question. This specification need not be complete. Of course, a more complete specification will yield more interesting properties about the agent's current and future belief states.
We have another constraint on the specification of D over the initial situations: the situations D -related to an initial situation are themselves initial, i.e., the agent believes that initially nothing has happened. We assert this constraint as an initial state axiom:
Properties
In this section, we highlight some of the more interesting properties of our framework. In order to clarify our explanations and facilitate a comparison with previous approaches to belief change, it will be important for us to attach a specific meaning to the use of the terms revision and update, which we shall do here.
Belief Revision
Recall (Section 2.2) that belief revision is suited to the acquisition of information about static environments for which the agent may have mistaken or partial information. In our framework, this can only be achieved through the use of sensing actions. We suppose that to revise by a formula ¡ , there is a corresponding sensing action capable of determining the truth value of ¡ . Moreover, we assume that this sensing action has no effect on the environment; the only fluent it changes is D . 10 More formally, we define a revision action as follows: 
We now show that belief revisions are handled appropriately in our system in the sense that if the sensor indicates that 
is not necessarily among the most plausible accessible situations, the agent can consistently believe 
Belief Update
Belief update refers to the belief change that takes place due to a change in the environment. In analogy to revision, we introduce the notion of an update action. (Recall that we assume that actions are always possible.) 
Introspection
In Section 3, we claimed that the agent can introspect its beliefs. We do indeed have this as a theorem.
This is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 1.
Awareness of Mistakes
In Section 3, we also claimed that the agent can introspect its past beliefs. Now suppose that the agent believes 
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Example
We now present an example to illustrate how this theory of belief change can be applied. We model a world in which there are two rooms, 
'
, then it is assumed to be in 0 C 2
. There are three actions: the agent leaves the room it is in and enters the other room (LEAVE), the agent senses whether it is in
(SENSEINR ' ), and the agent senses whether the light is on in the room in which it is currently located (SENSELIGHT).
The successor state axioms and guarded sensed fluent axioms for our example, which we will call ¥ , are as follows:
Next we must specify the initial state. This includes both the physical state of the domain and the belief state of the agent. First we describe the initial physical state of the domain, by saying which domain-dependent fluents hold in the actual initial situation,
£ ¥ ¤
. Initially, the lights in both rooms are on and the agent is in 0 2
(this is illustrated on the left side of Figure 2 holds. Specifying this belief state directly can be cumbersome. For example, the axiom for the situations with plausibility 1 is:
For now, we will not enumerate the set of axioms that specify the belief state shown in Figure 2 . But we assume that we have such a set which, together with the axioms for the initial physical state, we refer to as § . After we have discussed the example, we will show that there is a more elegant way to specify the initial belief state of the agent. So for this example, 
'
and one in which it is not on. Therefore, the agent is unsure as to whether the light is on. vi. Now the agent leaves . This is an example of an update. vii. The light in 0 1 ' was on initially, and since no action was performed that changed the state of the light, the light remains on. After checking its light sensor, the agent believes that the light is on in
This example shows that the agent's beliefs change appropriately after both revision actions and update actions. The example also demonstrates that our formalism can accommodate iterated belief change. The agent goes from believing that the light is not on, to believing that it is on, to not believing one way or the other, and then back to believing that it is on.
To facilitate the specification of the initial belief state of the agent, we find it convenient to define another belief operator , in the spirit of the conditional logic connective [14] : 
We can use this operator to specify the initial belief state of the agent without having to explicitly mention the plausibility of situations. To obtain the results of Theorem 9, it suffices to let § be the following set of axioms: LIGHT
It is easy to see that the belief state depicted in Fig , there is one where the is light is off in
and one in which the light is on (resp.).
Discussion
There are various aspects of our framework that deserve further consideration. We address what we consider to be some of the more important issues here.
Plausibility Ordering
Our plausibility function is based on ordinal conditional (°) functions [6, 21] . However, our assignment of plausibilities to situations is fixed, whereas the plausibility assigned to a world using a°-function can change when revisions occur. The dynamics of belief in our framework derives from the dynamics of the D relation, rather than that of the plausibility assignment.
In Darwiche and Pearl's framework [6] , the°-ranking of a world that does not satisfy the formula in a revision increases by 1. However, if the world satisfies the revision formula in future revisions, the world's°-ranking decreases, and if it decreases to 0, the world will help determine the beliefs of the agent. In our framework, when a sensing action occurs, any situation £ ! that disagrees with the actual value of the sensor is removed from the D relation (actually, its successor is removed). The successors of £ ! will never be readmitted to D , so they will never help determine the beliefs of the agent.
One may think that having a fixed plausibility assignment limits the applicability of our approach. Consider an example 11 where, most plausibly, a cat is asleep at home, but where after phoning home, most plausibly, the cat is awake. (Nothing is certain in either case.) This might seem to require adjustment of the plausibility assignment.
To handle this example, we need first to observe that in the action theory we are using, actions are taken to be deterministic, with effects described by successor state axioms, quite apart from properties of belief and plausibility. If in some situations a phone action wakes the cat, and in others not, then there has to be some property ± such that we can write a successor state axiom of the following form: AWAKE
o ther actions that can wake cats
R § 
£ ¤
In fact, in the process of developing the approach described in this paper, we experimented with various schemes where the plausibility assigned to situations could be updated. But we found that this led to problems for introspection. Consider a scheme where we combine the plausibility assignment with the belief accessibility relation by adding an extra argument to the 
hold. The natural way to update the plausibilities after sensing would be to make the most plausible situations from a situation do¦ SENSELIGHT
© )
be the ones that agree with on the value of SF¦ SENSELIGHT . So, if we 12 We can also handle a variant where nothing is believed about the cat sleeping initially by making the first two groups the most plausible. have the same belief structure, so the constraint violation mentioned above is resolved.
Unfortunately, under this new scheme we have a problem with beliefs about future beliefs.
If we were to redefine Bel in the obvious way to accommodate the extra argument in D , our example would entail the very counterintuitive Bel
£ ¤
, the agent believes that the light is not on but thinks that after sensing he will believe that it is on. Our approachwhich uses a fixed plausibility ordering on situations and simply drops situations that conflict with sensing results from the D relation-avoids both of these problems.
Another interesting difference between our approach and many of the proposals for modifying the plausibility ordering [4, 6, 21, 22] is that they adopt orderings over possible worlds which do not contain a history of the actions that have taken place in the world. Our approach, on the other hand, is based on situations, which do have such histories. While Friedman and Halpern [8] do not adopt situations, their possible worlds (runs) do include a history.
Comparison with AGM and KM
In order to effect a comparison with established belief change frameworks-in particular, the AGM and KM frameworks-we need to first establish a common footing. The first notion to establish is what is meant by the epistemic (or belief) state of the agent. We define a belief state (relative to a given situation) to consist of those formulae believed true at a particular situation. We limit our attention to formulae uniform in a situation since the AGM and KM are state-based methods, and so there is no need to consider beliefs regarding more than one situation, i.e., situations other than the one currently under consideration. holds. In our framework, the agent is also not capable of recovering from inconsistency. Once everything is believed possible at a situation (i.e., it has no D -related situations), there is no action that can be performed to remedy this. Also note that it does not make sense in our framework to sense (or, for that matter, try to bring about) a formula ¡ known to be necessarily false (i.e., r ¢ ¡ 
)-(K 2) and (K 4)-(K 5).
Notice that postulate (K 3) is not satisfied because an update action for ¡ may have other effects, so despite the fact that the agent believes ¡ beforehand, we cannot guarantee that nothing will change. Boutilier [5] has a problem with this postulate ((U2) in the KM rendering) for similar reasons. In his framework, (update) actions have plausibilities, and the most plausible action explaining the new information is assumed to have taken place. It could be that this action has other effects. To satisfy this postulate, he introduces a null event and considers a model in which this is the most plausible event at any world.
In our framework, iterated revision corresponds to the performing of at least two consecutive revision actions. We now show that there is some correspondence with the Darwiche and Pearl account of iterated belief revision. 
Theorem 12
Previous Work
Belief change in the situation calculus has already been dealt with by Scherl and Levesque [19] . However, as noted previously, while they can handle belief update, they are limited to belief expansion. del Val and Shoham [7] also address the issue of belief change in the situation calculus, and their theory deals with both revision and update. However, they cannot represent nested belief and consequently cannot deal with the issues of belief introspection and mistaken belief. 13 Applying Definition 10, we have that
There are a variety of frameworks that accommodate both belief revision and belief update. As noted, this is one strength of the proposal by del Val and Shoham [7] . In a more traditional belief change setting, Boutilier [3] also provides a general framework that allows for both these forms of change. However, this framework cannot deal with introspection in the object language. One approach that supports both belief revision and update and also handles introspection is Friedman and Halpern [8] . Their approach to revision and update is fairly standard, but set within a very general modal logic framework that combines operators for knowledge, belief (interpreted a using plausibility ordering), and time. But they do not discuss interactions between revision and update and introspection.
We also think that it may suffer from some of the problems mentioned in Section 6.1 that prompted us to abandon approaches based on updating plausibilities.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed an account of iterated belief change that integrates into a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus [18] . This has some advantages, in that previous work on the underlying theory can be exploited for dealing with issues such as solving the frame problem, performing automated reasoning about the effects of actions, specifying and reasoning about complex actions, etc. Our framework supports the introspection of beliefs and ensures that the agent is aware of when it was mistaken about its beliefs. Our account of iterated belief change differs from previous accounts in that, for us, the plausibility assignment to situations remains fixed over time. The dynamics of belief derives from the dynamics of the D modality and of the domain-dependent fluents. We showed that our theory satisfies the majority of the AGM, KM, and DP postulates.
Our approach does have some limitations. In this paper, we have only looked at cases of belief change where the sensors are accurate, so that the agent only revises its beliefs by sentences that are actually true. It is the case that our successor state axiom for D ensures that the agent believes the output of its sensor after sensing. Also, our guarded sensed fluent axioms allow only hard (but context-dependent) constraints to be specified between the output of the sensor and the associated fluent; one cannot state that the sensor is only correct with a certain probability. However, we can also use beliefs to correlate sensor values to the associated fluents instead of guarded sensed fluent axioms. Thus, we could specify that the agent prefers histories where the sensors agree with the associated fluents more often to histories where they agree less often. We will explore this approach in future work. Note that Bacchus et al. [2] have a probabilistic account of noisy sensors in the situation calculus.
In Theorem 10, we saw that our framework captures some, but not all, of the AGM revision postulates. In particular, the agent may end up believing everything after a revision by a consistent formula ¡ , if none of its D -alternatives satisfies ¡ , violating (Kb 5). This, together with the fact that we never update the plausibility assignment, may suggest that our account has limited expressiveness. But we maintain that this is not the case. The example of Section 6.1 shows that we can handle some cases where a plausibility assignment update seems to be required. As well, we can construct theories where the (Kb 5) postulate does hold. This is done by ensuring that the D relation contains enough situations initially.
14 The need to ensure that enough epistemic alternatives are initially present if one wants to avoid inconsistency is not specific to our approach. In most frameworks, a similar issue arises with respect to revision by conjunctive observations. In future work, we will investigate the expressive limits of our framework.
We could also extend the framework by having multiple agents that act independently and impart information to each other. Instead of beliefs changing only through sensing, they would also change as a result of inform actions. Shapiro et al. [20] provide a framework for belief expansion resulting from the occurrence of inform actions in the situation calculus, which we would like to generalize to handle belief revision.
Lakemeyer and Levesque [12] incorporate the logic of only knowing into the Scherl and Levesque framework of belief update and expansion. The traditional belief (and knowledge) operator specifies formulae that are believed (or known) by the agent, but there could be others. The 'only knows' operator is used to describe all that the agent knows, i.e., a formula that corresponds exactly to the knowledge state of the agent. In future work, we would like to define an analogous 'only believes' operator that could be used to describe exactly what the agent believes in a framework that supports belief revision as well as belief expansion.
